




Howard Shevrin on Peter Wolff
April 28, 1998. Peter Wolff ’s elegant essay in JAPA 44/2 deserves
careful attention, as his argument against the relevance of infant obser-
vations to psychoanalysis is at bottom an argument against the relevance
of any research to psychoanalysis. As he states at the conclusion of his
response to his commentators, “all that is relevant for psychoanalysis
must come from the couch” (p. 473). Arnold Wilson, in his commen-
tary, appears to be aware of this implication when he states that “ironi-
cally, Wolff’s arguments with respect to research on infants are equally
applicable to the clinical psychoanalysis he seeks to preserve . . . ”
(p. 457). In effect, Wolff’s argument is a powerful version of the posi-
tion I attributed to “Dr. Case” in my plenary dialogue published in JAPA
43/4, with all of its undoubted strengths and considerable limitations.
As Wolff correctly notes, the psychoanalytic method is unique and
irreplaceable. It does make possible at its best a process of personal dis-
covery no other method can duplicate. But it is also based on certain
fundamental assumptions about the nature of the mind that are not in
themselves testable “fromthecouch.”Wolff asserts that psychoanalysis
is about “phenomena subsumed under the concepts of unconscious
ideas, hidden motives, and repression . . . ” and that psychoanalytic
theories should “specify a method or methods for exploring the poly-
semous meanings of irrational fantasies, dreams, and actions that are
presumed to be motivated by unconscious ideas” (p. 370; emphasis
added). But it is exactly in the presumption of an unconscious that is
both psychological and motivational in nature that psychoanalysis has
encountered the most skepticism from scientific quarters, including the
neurosciences that Wolff (and Barnaby Barratt) quote with satisfaction
on the complex nature of memory.
Moreover, by correctly emphasizing the importance of polysemous
meanings, Wolff introduces another fundamental assumption, and a real
bugbear in the minds of other scientists—the apparent abandon with
which psychoanalysts decide that a particular manifest content carries
with it other, “hidden” meanings. Psychoanalysts from Freud on have
assumed that the unconscious does not reveal itself directly and mani-
festly but through displacements and condensations of meaning—
another grand assumption, useful and necessary to psychoanalysts, but
not self-evident to many others.
These two assumptions, referred to by Freud as the “pillars” of the
psychoanalytic method—a psychological unconscious and the indirect
manifestation of unconscious ideas—require research extrinsic to data
obtained on the couch. Logically, they cannot be proven by psycho-
analysis itself, a point made by Edelson, as well as by Freud.
Fortunately, not only is such research possible, but a good start has
been made on doing it (see Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel, and Williams
1996; Brakel, Camaj, Snodgrass, and Shevrin 1996).
Lastly, Wolff’s position, drawing on chaos theory and the theory
of self-organizing systems, contains at its heart a paradox: if our past
cannot predict our future, of what use is psychoanalysis? A suc-
cessful psychoanalysis should make possible a better future, certainly
better than the problematic past the patient has suffered from, or else
what good are our hard-won analytic discoveries? Or is Wolff ready
to concede that no matter how good a psychoanalysis, no matter how
important the personal discoveries, some accidental change in
“initial conditions” will render it all moot. Indeed, the course of an
analysis is itself subject to the same chaotic vicissitudes as our
childhood past, and there is no way of knowing that the discoveries
of one hour, or the dynamic changes in one phase of the analysis, will
persist beyond it. Nor are these vicissitudes a matter of analyzable
resistances because they are inherent in the nature of how the mind
as a complex system operates. Yes, one might be able to identify
complex dynamic patterns at one point or another, but this very
discovery is itself subject to the law of initial conditions and can as
readily disappear as persist. Certainly the dynamics of memory cited
by Wolff and Barratt make it even less likely that the memory of
the discovery will remain unchanged within the time span of the
analysis. What is remembered as the discovery at one time can be
misremembered and distorted at a subsequent time, and neither
analyst nor patient will be able to tell the difference because for
each the original memory trace has been transformed by all the
incalculable, intervening vicissitudes of life. One might argue in
response that despite memory distortions certain dynamic changes
may have occurred that neither patient nor analyst is aware of; but
these dynamic changes are themselves subject to the law of initial
conditions and can change chaotically.
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To put it more succinctly, if the childhood past is subject to the
law of initial conditions, why not any past, including the years spent
in psychoanalysis? And if so, why undertake it? We had no choice
about being born, but we can choose not to be analyzed.
The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus maintained that one could
not step into the same river twice, to which another pre-Socratic
philosopher, Parmenides, responded that despite that there was still
a river. This dialectic has gone on ever since and is reflected in the
Heraclitean position taken by Wolff against the staunchly Parmenidean
position taken by most child researchers. But there is another way of
phrasing the issue: What changes, and what remains the same?
Something has to be invariant or else there would be true chaos rather
than the non-random, misnamed chaos of chaos theory. Life would be
a series of disconnected, stochastic moments, as if we were forever in
constantly changing fugue states. Since Wolff clearly does not sub-
scribe to this view, he must tell us what in his view is invariant in child-
hood development and what is invariant in a psychoanalysis. Wolff’s
position requires him to presuppose that over and above chaotic,
dynamic changes there are more linear changes not subject to the law
of initial conditions and on the basis of which the understanding of
these dynamic changes can be formulated, so that mastery of these
dynamic processes might occur; otherwise all is a Heraclitean flux like
the ephemeral eddies and whirlpools a flowing river forms while still
remaining a river, inexorably rushing between its Parmenidean banks to
the ocean year after year.
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